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Un-approved GEMGenetically modiﬁed plants, in the following referred to as genetically modiﬁed organisms or GMOs, have
been commercially grown for almost two decades. In 2010 approximately 10% of the total global crop acreage
was planted with GMOs (James, 2011). More than 30 countries have been growing commercial GMOs, and
many more have performed ﬁeld trials. Although the majority of commercial GMOs both in terms of acreage
and speciﬁc events belong to the four species: soybean, maize, cotton and rapeseed, there are another 20+
species where GMOs are commercialized or in the pipeline for commercialization. The number of GMOs cul-
tivated in ﬁeld trials or for commercial production has constantly increased during this time period. So have
the number of species, the number of countries involved, the diversity of novel (added) genetic elements and
the global trade. All of these factors contribute to the increasing complexity of detecting and correctly iden-
tifying GMO derived material. Many jurisdictions, including the European Union (EU), legally distinguish be-
tween authorized (and therefore legal) and un-authorized (and therefore illegal) GMOs. Information about
the developments, ﬁeld trials, authorizations, cultivation, trade and observations made in the ofﬁcial GMO
control laboratories in different countries around the world is often limited, despite several attempts such
as the OECD BioTrack for voluntary dissemination of data. This lack of information inevitably makes it chal-
lenging to detect and identify GMOs, especially the un-authorized GMOs. The present paper reviews the
state of the art technologies and approaches in light of coverage, practicability, sensitivity and limitations.
Emphasis is put on exemplifying practical detection of un-authorized GMOs. Although this paper has a Euro-
pean (EU) bias when examples are given, the contents have global relevance.
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1.1. Signiﬁcance of GMOs
Genetically engineered or genetically modiﬁed (GM) plants, here-
after referred to as GM organisms (GMOs), are deﬁned as organisms
“in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does
not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination”
(European Commission, 2001). As from the early developments of ge-
netic engineering, the scientiﬁc society raised its concerns about this
novel technology (Berg et al., 1975). As such, the development and in
particular any commercial use of GMOs are subject to strict legal reg-
ulations in most countries around the world. The established legal
framework mainly addresses all risks for the release of GMO in the
environment and for consumption of GM materials for human and
animal health. There can also be limitations to the use; a GMO can
for example be legally used as a feed but not as a food. This was for
example the case for StarLink™maize in the USA. To support the free-
dom of choice of consumers, in many countries a mandatory or volun-
tary labeling of products containing GM material has been
established, including speciﬁcations of thresholds for labeling.Infringement of the legislation may lead in the worst case to the recall
of a GM product from the market, resulting in major economic loss
and/or ecological damage. It can also, hypothetically be necessary to
retract a GMO after release. There is consequently a need for tools
to detect, identify and quantify GMOs and products derived from
GMOs. In the following the term GMO will include the derived
products.1.2. Genetic and phenotypic detection of GMOs
Almost all GMOs developed so far have been modiﬁed by insertion
of extra DNA (BCH, 2011; CERA, 2011; GMO Compass, 2011). If all
added DNA is derived from the recipient species itself or a species
with which it can naturally exchange genes, then the resulting GMO
is here classiﬁed as cisgenic if the inserted elements have not been
rearranged, or as intragenic if the inserted elements have been rear-
ranged (see also Lusser et al., 2011). If some or all added DNA is de-
rived from another species with which the recipient cannot
naturally exchange genes, then the resulting GMO is classiﬁed as
transgenic (see also annexes of European Commission, 2001).
1320 A. Holst-Jensen et al. / Biotechnology Advances 30 (2012) 1318–1335The genetic modiﬁcation in all GM plants is, with the deﬁnition of
GMOs above, by deﬁnition a change in the DNA sequence information
(cf. Lusser et al., 2011). A genetic modiﬁcation is by deﬁnition there-
fore always detectable at the DNA level. The presence of a genetic
modiﬁcation can often be detected at the transcriptional level, either
due to synthesis of novel transcripts or indirectly by the silencing of
native transcription (acting via RNA interference [RNAi]; mainly in in-
tragenics and cisgenics; Frizzi and Huang, 2010). However, transcrip-
tion regulation can be heavily inﬂuenced by external conditions
among others the age/developmental stage of the organism, the
organ/tissue/cell-type and temporal (circadian, seasonal) inﬂuence.
Modiﬁcations affecting only the level (up or down regulation) of ex-
pression of genes already expressed can be particularly difﬁcult to de-
tect (see also Mukherji et al., 2011). Detection of GMO through
transcription analyses is therefore not commonly applicable and re-
quires in general more scrutiny against false positives/negatives
than targeted DNA sequence analyses.
Translational products, i.e. proteins, have also been used as GMO
tagging targets. Distinct transcripts are sometimes translated into in-
discriminate proteins due to the degeneracy/redundancy of the ge-
netic code. Because of this and their inherent dependence on
transcription and their generally lesser stability, proteins are not suit-
able for GMO detection in a wide range of products (e.g. processed
food/feed).
Finally, the expressed phenotype itself can sometimes provide suf-
ﬁcient information to identify a GMO, e.g. when the novel trait pro-
vides tolerance to a particular herbicide (www.seedtechnology.net).
Again, the range of application of the phenotype as a GMO detection
tool is very limited. In case of herbicide crop tolerance, the plants
need to be grown. Also, distinction needs to be made between engi-
neered phenotypes and naturally occurring mutants. Phenotypic ap-
proaches are therefore generally not very suitable for detection/
identiﬁcation of a GMO.
2. The “modular approach” in GMO analysis
2.1. The concept of modularity
In the EU and many other countries, the GMO analytical procedure
is viewed as the complete procedure starting with a sample and in-
cluding all steps performed to determine the presence, identify and
quantify (when necessary) the GMOs in products such as food, feed
or seed, until ﬁnally a measurement result is provided (Fig. 1).
An example of this principle can be found in the guidance docu-
ment on measurement uncertainty for GMO testing laboratories
adopted by the European Network of GMO Laboratories (ENGL) (see
Fig. 2 in Trapmann et al., 2009). It is also reﬂected in the organization
of the international standards on GMO detection (see Fig. 1 in ISO,Product Sample
preparation
DNAextraction/
purification
re
re
STEP1 STEP2
Analytical me
Analytical procedure w
Fig. 1. The modular approach in GMO analysis. The analytical procedure within the laborat
place upstream. The analytical method is a core element in the analytical procedure and i
Each module is a distinct tool or operation. For a single step there are sometimes several a
Modiﬁed from Holst-Jensen and Berdal (2004) and Trapmann et al. (2009).2006). A central component of all analytical procedures is the analyt-
ical method itself. As for GMO detection in the EU, DNA is to date the
sole analyte applied for legal purposes (European Commission,
2004a; Holst-Jensen et al., 2006). An analytical procedure for GMO
testing covers the sample preparation, DNA extraction and puriﬁca-
tion, (real-time) PCR ampliﬁcation and data evaluation. Historically,
the analytical method was considered an indivisible unity, with refer-
ence to a phenomenon called a “matrix effect”. The matrix effect in
analytical chemistry is deﬁned as: “the combined effect of all compo-
nents of the sample other than the analyte on the measurement of the
quantity” (IUPAC, 1997). However, there is now a growing accep-
tance of the so-called “modular approach” (Holst-Jensen and Berdal,
2004), provided that speciﬁc performance requirements are satisﬁed
(see e.g. Bellocchi et al., 2010; Debode et al., 2007; European
Commission, 2006b; Grohmann et al., 2009; 2011). The modular ap-
proach has also recently been adopted for microbiological applica-
tions (Kagkli et al., 2011). According to the modular approach the
sample preparation, DNA extraction and PCRs for individual target se-
quences can be treated as separate modules that together form a
method. A module can therefore be deﬁned as a distinct and limited
operation that is performed on an input material and which delivers
an altered output material or data. Examples of modules are: 1) a
sample preparation module where the input material is e.g. grains
and the output material could be ﬂour; 2) a DNA extraction and puri-
ﬁcation module where the input material is ﬂour and the output ma-
terial is puriﬁed DNA in aqueous solution; 3) a real-time PCR module
where the input material is a puriﬁed DNA in aqueous solution and
the output material is a measurement of ﬂuorescence and translation
into a number of target sequence copies; or 4) a data evaluation mod-
ule where the available data are processed into a ﬁnal measurement
result (Fig. 1).
2.2. Modules for GMO detection
The advantages of a modular approach are primarily increased
ﬂexibility and a potential for ad hoc design of rational and cost effec-
tive validation and testing strategies. The modular approach has so far
mainly found application for analyses of DNA using PCR technology,
but the approach is theoretically applicable also to other targets
than DNA. Here, we will focus only on the PCR module, which could
be recognized as the analytical module sensu stricto in GMO analysis.
Each analytical module is characterized ﬁrst of all by its speciﬁcity.
For PCR modules it is common to discriminate between four levels of
speciﬁcity (Fig. 2) in the context of GMO detection.
2.2.1. Taxon speciﬁc modules
A species/taxon speciﬁc module detects a sequence known to be
speciﬁc for the target species/taxon. Ideally the target sequence isMeasurement
result
Ref.gene
al-time PCR
GM target
a-time PCRl
Data
evaluation
STEP3
STEP4
thod
ithin laboratory
ory is shown, but the complete analytical procedure also includes the sampling taking
s viewed as a series of steps, each involving the use of one or more modules (boxes).
lternative modules available, allowing for increased ﬂexibility.
Fig. 2. The transformation process and the four levels of speciﬁcity of analytical modules targeting DNA sequences. In some cases there are additional partial or complete constructs
inserted. These can be located at the same or other loci (BCH, 2011; CERA, 2011; GMO Compass, 2011). The typical species/taxon speciﬁc screening target is a single copy seed spe-
ciﬁc or housekeeping gene.
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taxa. Furthermore, it should not exhibit allelic variation (Hernandez
et al., 2004; Papazova et al., 2010). In case the module is intended
for quantitative purposes, presence of the target sequence as a single
copy in the haploid genome of the taxon is preferred. Species/taxon
speciﬁc modules are suitable for identiﬁcation and quantiﬁcation of
ingredients (deﬁned as all material derived from a given species/
taxon). The measured quantity of species/taxon material in a product
provides the basis for calculation of the relative GMO content per in-
gredient, as for example required in EU regulations (European
Commission, 2003b; 2011). This quantity is most accurately estimat-
ed with reference to haploid genome equivalents (HGE) as recom-
mended by the EC (European Commission, 2004a; see also Holst-
Jensen et al., 2006). It is usually necessary to determine the limit of
detection (LOD) and the limit of quantiﬁcation (LOQ) of a PCR mod-
ule. These parameters are initially determined in absolute terms
(number of units of the analytical target) using a single ingredient
(absolute LOD [LODabs] and LOQ [LOQabs]). The combined data for
the two PCR modules are often translated into a “PCR method” specif-
ic relative LOD and LOQ. In real-life situations ingredients are often
mixed and/or the ingredients have been processed in ways that re-
duce the quantities and detectability of target DNA sequences present
in a product. The true relative LOD (and LOQ) will therefore differ be-
tween samples. The species/taxon quantity is the main parameter de-
termining the practical (sample speciﬁc) relative limits of detection
(LODpract) and quantiﬁcation (LOQpract) for GMOs belonging to that
particular species/taxon (cf. Holst-Jensen et al., 2003).
2.2.2. Element speciﬁc modules
A single element speciﬁc PCR module targets a single discrete
inserted DNA sequence motif. This motif can for example be a pro-
moter, a terminator, an intron or the coding part of a gene. Element
speciﬁc modules are suitable for screening to determine whether a
sample is likely to contain GMO or not. Element screening can also
limit the list of candidate GMOs and provide clues to the identity of
present GMO(s). Both regulatory elements such as promoters and
terminators, as well as trait and selection marker genes and cloning
vector elements can be targeted with single element speciﬁc PCR
modules. The majority of single elements are to date derived fromnatural (non-GM) donors such as viruses, bacteria and plants. Thus,
the presence of single elements does not always provide conclusive
evidence of presence of GMO. In many cases it is therefore necessary
to include as a control a speciﬁc PCR module to test for the presence
of the donor organism. These control modules would belong to the
taxon speciﬁc modules (Section 2.2.1).
2.2.3. Construct speciﬁc modules
A construct speciﬁc PCR module targets an inserted DNA sequence
motif composed of at least two elements that do not naturally co-
exist in this conformation. In other words, in such a chimeric se-
quence the 5′ and 3′ end of the sequence motif are derived from
two separate elements. A construct speciﬁc module applies two dis-
crete oligonucleotide primers each hybridizing to one of the elements
in the chimera. Construct speciﬁc modules are suitable for screening
and quantiﬁcation and provide indisputable evidence of presence of
GMOs when a positive test result is obtained. Construct speciﬁc mod-
ules are only exceptionally suitable for identiﬁcation of a GMO since
the same construct (or chimeric motif) can be present in more than
one GMO.
2.2.4. Event speciﬁc modules
Finally, an event speciﬁc PCR module targets a sequence motif
unique to a single GMO. The event speciﬁc sequence motif is the un-
equivocal signature, or tag, of a particular GMO. In most cases it is cre-
ated de novo when the construct is integrated into the recipient
genome. Event speciﬁc sequence motifs are usually but not always
the integration–border regions i.e. the fusion sequence composed of
the terminal basepairs of the inserted DNA and the adjacent basepairs
of the recipient host genome at the insertion locus. A construct specif-
ic target (Section 2.2.3) cannot be event speciﬁc because the same
construct can be used repeatedly to develop new GMOs. Event specif-
ic PCR modules are particularly suitable for identiﬁcation and quanti-
ﬁcation and represent the legal basis in the authorization of a GMO
for commercial use as food/feed in among others the EU. To approve
a GMO for commercial use, the EU requests the notiﬁer to provide a
detection method speciﬁc to the GMO and the corresponding control
samples (European Commission, 2003a). The provided method is
then validated through interlaboratory testing under supervision of
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assisted by the ENGL. The results of these analyses together with
the details on the method are published by the EURL-GMFF on its
website http://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.
2.2.5. Validation and other modules
Multi-laboratory and collaborative trial validations of GMO detec-
tion methods are also conducted outside the EU legal context. For ex-
ample the validation of a DNA extraction module (Waiblinger et al.,
2007), and of real-time PCR modules for species speciﬁc (Yang
et al., 2005), element and construct speciﬁc (Feinberg et al., 2005;
Grohmann and Mäde, 2009; Grohmann et al., 2009; 2011; Shindo
et al., 2002), and event speciﬁc targets (Akiyama et al., 2010; Pan
et al., 2007). One multiplex assay has also been collaborative trial val-
idated: the DualChip® GMO (Leimanis et al., 2008). Informative
sources on the status of some representative GMO detection methods
include but are not limited to the GMO detection methods databases
(GMDD; Dong et al., 2008; http://gmdd.shgmo.org/) and (GMO-
METHODS; http://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/gmomethods/; EURL-
GMFF, 2011).
3. Classiﬁcation of GMOs
3.1. Classiﬁcation based on origin of the inserted genetic elements—four
generations of GMOs
3.1.1. The ﬁrst generation—single trait transgenes
The ﬁrst generation and most of the present commercial GMOs
were produced using enzymatic cut-and-paste technology (restric-
tion digests and ligation). In these GMOs the desired trait gene(s)
were combined with virtually universally functional and constitutive
promoters and terminator elements such as the cauliﬂower mosaic
virus (CaMV) 35S promoter (P35S) and terminator (T35S) and the
nopaline synthase promoter (P-nos) and terminator (T-nos) derived
from Agrobacterium tumefaciens (Hemmer, 1997). Frequently a sec-
ond construct was also made that would typically code for a pheno-
type that facilitated identiﬁcation and selection of the transformed
plant cells. These genetic constructs were then inserted into circular
cloning vectors of bacterial or viral origin for rapid propagation.
The cloning vectors usually also contained marker genes for selec-
tion and propagation of those bacteria in which the vector had been
transfected. The speciﬁc insertion locus of the construct into the re-
cipient plant genome varied from cell to cell, and it was the rule
that some parts of the cloning vectors in addition to the desired con-
struct(s) were co-inserted. Thus, the ﬁrst generation and most of the
current commercial GMOs containmembers of a limited set of genetic
elements.
The functional genetic construct responsible for a desired trait
contains at least a promoter, a gene and a terminator. Constructs
often also contain an additional enhancer, intron or signal motif, con-
tributing to transcriptional regulation and post-transcriptional signal-
ing in the cell. Cloning vector derived elements such as selection
marker genes, polylinkers and the Agrobacterium Ti-plasmid left and
right border elements are present in many but not all GMOs. The
presence of these elements and their speciﬁc distribution, combina-
tions and organization in different GMOs represent information that
can be exploited by analysts. We will return to this in Sections 5
and 10.
3.1.2. Second generation—stacked trait GMOs
The second generation of GMOs, i.e. the so-called stacked GMOs
are usually hybrid crosses between ﬁrst generation GMOs (e.g.
Bt11×GA21 maize) or retransformed ﬁrst generation GMOs (e.g.
MON15985 cotton, retransformed fromMON531 cotton). Stacked hy-
brid GMOs are difﬁcult to discriminate from their parental ﬁrst gener-
ation GMOs, with exception of testing of single seeds or plants(Akiyama et al., 2005; Holst-Jensen et al., 2006; Taverniers et al.,
2008). Many of the commercial cotton and maize GMOs grown at
present are stacked GMOs (James, 2011) and nearly 50% of the dos-
siers received by the European Commission since 2004 concern
stacked GMOs (GMO Compass, 2011).
3.1.3. Third generation—near-intragenics
The third generation of GMOs is comprised of so-called near-
intragenics or GMOs where the inserted transgenic elements have
not been used in other (known) GMOs. Near-intragenics are GMOs
where the major part of the insert is host-derived and where the re-
combinant part of the insert is very restricted (e.g. limited to short
segments derived from the cloning vector). The potato event AV43-
6-G7 is an example of a near-intragenic GMO (AVEBE, 2009). Com-
mon to third generation GMOs is also that they are much more difﬁ-
cult to detect than ﬁrst and second generation GMOs. This is
discussed in more detail in Section 11.
3.1.4. Fourth generation—intragenics and cisgenics
True intragenics and in particular cisgenics, are likely to be intro-
duced as a fourth generation of GMOs (Lusser et al., 2011). In these
GMOs, the inserted elements will invariantly be derived from the
gene pool available for natural recombination for the recipient spe-
cies. Thus, detection of the inserted elements alone cannot be used
as evidence of genetic modiﬁcation. Fortunately, even for these
GMOs, the speciﬁc order and insertion loci of the inserted elements
will offer potential for DNA based detection and identiﬁcation. It is
of particular relevance that typical event speciﬁc motifs associated
with the insertion loci (cf. Fig. 2) are likely to appear also in these
GMOs. Gene expression patterns also offer some, however limited po-
tential for detection of intragenics and cisgenics, cf. the discussion of
transcriptomics approaches in Section 1.2.
3.2. Classiﬁcation based on DNA sequence information knowledge
The key to detection and correct identiﬁcation by and large lies in
knowledge about the inserted elements, their organization and the
insertion loci ﬂanking the inserts. It is therefore logical to classify
GMOs based on insert sequence knowledge (ISK) available to the an-
alytical laboratory developing or using the analytical module(s).
3.2.1. Fully characterized GMOs (ISK-class 1)
This class is comprised by GMOs where the complete insert and
ﬂanking DNA sequences are known. Within the EU a notiﬁer applying
for authorization of a GMO must provide this information along with
an event speciﬁc quantitative detection method and control samples
to the EC services (European Commission, 2003a, 2003b). ISK-class
1 includes all GMOs authorized for commercial release within the
EU. However, for the National Reference Laboratories (NRLs) within
the EU (European Commission, 2004b, 2006b) it also includes all
other GMOs for which a complete dossier is available to the European
Food Safety Authority's (EFSA's) GMO panel and the national Compe-
tent Authorities (e.g. via EFSA's GMO Extranet; https://sciencenet.
efsa.europa.eu/portal/server.pt/). Other countries that require a spe-
ciﬁc detection method to be submitted together with an application
for authorization include among others Brazil (Brazil, 2008), Malaysia
(Malaysia, 2007) and South Africa (South Africa, 2005). GMOs pend-
ing authorization and GMOs for which authorization is not renewed
(see e.g. European Commission, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d,
2007e), are to be considered as ISK-class 1 GMOs. Detection and cor-
rect identiﬁcation of ISK-class 1 GMOs can be done using event specif-
ic modules. Before authorization the EURL-GMFF together with
members of the ENGL validates a speciﬁc detection method for the
GMO. After validation the EURL-GMFF publishes all validated
methods on the internet (http://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
statusofdoss.htm). Corresponding certiﬁed reference material is to
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which the EURL-GMFF has validated a method can consequently be
considered members of ISK-class 1 for all GMO laboratories in the
world.
3.2.2. GMOs not fully characterized but transformed with known
construct(s) (ISK-class 2)
The same genetic construct is often used to develop several trans-
formants (events). Usually, only one or exceptionally a few of these
events are brought as far as to ﬁeld trials and commercialization.
However, there are several examples of such sister or back-up events
and in some cases only one of them is authorized. Examples include
MON809 and MON810 maize, T14 and T25 maize, and RF1 and RF2
rapeseed (CERA, 2011; GMO Compass, 2011). There are even a few
apparent examples where, due to human error and/or insufﬁcient
quality control at the breeding/seed handling, an un-authorized
event escaped and was later traced in the food or feed chain:
CBH351 (StarLink™) maize (EPA, 2008), Bt10 and Bt11 maize and
DAS 59122 and DAS 59132 maize (see http://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.
eu/). For CBH351, Bt10 and DAS 59132 maize, event speciﬁc modules
were not available by the time the GMO was ﬁrst detected in the
food/feed chain. This exempliﬁes that reliance only on the availability
of event speciﬁc modules is incompatible with detection of un-
authorized homologous events. Construct speciﬁc modules on the
other hand are well suited for detection of such events, but are unﬁt
for identiﬁcation/discrimination between them.
Construct speciﬁc detection modules are ubiquitously designed to
detect artiﬁcially fused genetic elements. Despite being referred to as
“construct speciﬁc” these modules do not detect the full construct,
only pairs of fused elements, so-called chimeras. ISK-class 2 therefore
includes all GMOs where the fusion of elements within the construct
is known a priori, even if the full length construct is not known. Some
of the construct speciﬁc modules are well suited as screening mod-
ules for the detection of GMOs, see e.g. Waiblinger et al. (2010).
3.2.3. GMOs transformed with constructs containing genetic elements
from GMOs of ISK-class 1 but where the speciﬁc construct is different
from the GMOs of ISK-class 1 (ISK-class 3)
A few transcription regulators such as the CaMV P35S and T-nos
have been used in a multitude of GMOs, including both commercial
and purely experimental events. Some trait genes, in particular from
the ﬁrst generation of GMOs, have also been used quite frequently:
e.g. bar, cp4-epsps, cry1A(b) and pat. However, these genes have com-
monly ﬁrst been modiﬁed to optimize transcription and translation in
eukaryotes and represent as such complete de novo artiﬁcial DNA se-
quences unique to GMO. A few selection marker genes are also com-
monly found in ﬁrst and second generation GMOs, e.g. nptII and bla
(CERA, 2011; GMO Compass, 2011; Hemmer, 1997). Several of these
elements are derived from non-GM donor organisms that can be
found in the environment and sometimes also in the food chain. For
particular genetic elements allelic differences at the DNA sequence
level are sometimes observed between different GMOs, and between
the natural donor and GMO(s). Detection methods targeting these ge-
netic elements are commonly exploited, successfully, to screen for
presence/absence of GMOs, and to obtain useful information about
the nature of putatively present GMOs (e.g. Chaouachi et al., 2008;
Hamels et al., 2009; Novak et al., 2009; Van den Bulcke et al., 2010;
Waiblinger et al., 2010). Allelic differences, in particular at the primer
and probe binding sites of a PCR, can affect the detectability of a par-
ticular genetic element (Broothaerts et al., 2008; Ghedira et al., 2009;
Holst-Jensen, 2009; Morisset et al., 2009). There are for example, sub-
stantial differences between the cry1A(b) gene variants found in the
natural (non-GM) donor Bacillus thuringiensis ssp. kurstaki, and
Bt11, Bt176 and MON810 maize (Fig. 3). The haplotypes of the gene
in the three GM maize events have been differently optimized for ex-
pression in plants/maize. The CaMV P35S on the other hand is anexample of an element where signiﬁcant allelic variation is also
found naturally (Fernandez et al., 2005). Positive analytical signals
can be caused by the natural non-GM donors and negative analytical
results can be caused by allelic variation. Prudent interpretation of
analytical results obtained with screening modules is therefore re-
quired. The use of a control module to detect the donor is strongly
recommended in some cases. Such modules are unfortunately only
exceptionally available (e.g. Cankar et al., 2005; Chaouachi et al.,
2008 Wolf et al., 2000 [CaMV]; Co-Extra, 2009 [Agrobacterium, Fig-
wort mosaic virus and Bacillus thuringiensis]).
3.2.4. GMOs transformed only with genetic elements not used in GMOs of
other ISK-classes (ISK-class 4)
With the emergence of high-throughput DNA sequencing technol-
ogies, the availability of novel genetic information including function-
al characterization of a multitude of genes and transcription
regulators from all kingdoms of life is growing at a high pace. For de-
velopers of GMOs this means that the selection of available genetic el-
ements that can be combined and introduced to new GMOs is
becoming virtually unlimited. For these elements there is usually no
validated/reliable detection module available. With accumulating
knowledge and technological progress it is also made easier to intro-
duce small modiﬁcations down to single nucleotide changes in genet-
ic elements found in GMOs of ISK-classes 1, 2 and 3. See Lusser et al.
(2011) for a detailed review of novel plant breeding technologies of
relevance. Such changes can be introduced and the result will then
be that the element(s) cannot be detected with the detection mod-
ules suitable for GMOs of ISK-classes 1, 2 and 3. The novel GMO re-
mains undetectable, even if an inserted element is putatively the
same as one previously known. Within the EU, a GMO can change sta-
tus from ISK-class 4 to ISK-class 1 once an application for EU authori-
zation of that GMO is received, provided that the application is
complete. Some of the GMOs currently pending authorizations within
the EU are examples of GMOs that went from ISK-class 4 status (as
unknown) to ISK-class 1 as a consequence of the authorization pro-
cess: the soybean events BPS-CV127-9 and DP 305423 and the
maize events LY 038 and DAS-40278-9. There are other GMOs in var-
ious stages of development and testing outside the EU that for the
Competent Authorities in the EU de facto fall into ISK-class 4. Notably,
this also demonstrates that occurrence of traces of a GMO of ISK-class
4 in the food chain within the EU is not an unlikely scenario. The sit-
uation is the same for other jurisdictions in the world because of the
lack of an effective global channel for communication of relevant in-
formation on GMO developments and ﬁeld trials (see also GAO,
2008 and Section 12).
3.3. Legal classiﬁcation of GMOs
GMOs are either authorized (approved, de-regulated …) and
therefore legal or they are un-authorized (un-approved, regulated
…) and therefore illegal on the market. Presence of some GMOs for
which authorization is pending or not renewed, is or has been toler-
ated for a limited period within the EU, provided that the quantity
is below a speciﬁed threshold and that the presence is adventitious
and technically unavoidable (European Commission, 2003a, 2007a,
2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e). Regulation EC 619/2011 (European
Commission, 2011) applies only to feed and provides details on the
sampling and methods of detection for low level presence (LLP) of
particular GMOs for which an authorization procedure is pending or
the authorization of which has expired. The core of this regulation is
the introduction of a minimum required performance limit (MRPL)
of 0.1% (relative to mass) as “the lowest amount or concentration of
analyte in a sample that has to be reliably detected and conﬁrmed
by ofﬁcial laboratories”. If the analyses cannot verify that the concen-
tration exceeds the MRPL (taking the measurement uncertainty into
Fig. 3. Segment of cry1A(b) gene alignment for the native Bacillus thuringiensis ssp. kurstaki gene and three GM maize events Bt11, Bt176 and MON810, showing signiﬁcant allelic
variability. The full length gene is more than 1800 bp. The alleles found in Bt11, Bt176 and MON810 are modiﬁed to optimize their expression in plants/maize.
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with the regulation.
In other jurisdictions, other practices may be applied. In Norway
for example, a European country that itself is not a member of the
EU, no GMO has yet (January 2012) been authorized for cultivation
or use in food or feed. But all GMOs authorized in the EU are in prac-
tice tolerated in food and feed in Norway, provided that the presence
is adventitious and that the quantity does not exceed the EU thresh-
old for labeling (0.9%). Presence of minor quantities of GMOs pending
authorization may also be tolerated in some jurisdictions, under par-
ticular conditions. In case of legal infringement, the EU has put in
place speciﬁc emergency measures to cope with particular un-
authorized GM maize or rice events (European Commission, 2005,
2006a, 2008). Japan is an example of another country where emer-
gency measures have also been implemented, e.g. for CBH351 and
Bt10 maize (Watanabe et al., 2007 and references therein). In 2011
linseed (ﬂax, event FP967), rice (LL601 and events expressing Bt
and/or CpTI protein), papaya (55-1 and PRSV-YK) and rape seed
(event GT73 in Brassica rapa) are subject to inspection orders in
Japan (JMHLW, 2011) based on a perceived high risk of violation of
the Food Sanitation Law. These are examples of documents that can
support decisions on sampling, testing and other actions to be
taken. The enforcement authorities and other involved stakeholders
therefore have to consult detailed legislation in cases where un-
authorized GMO is detected or its presence is particularly likely.
4. Where do un-authorized GMOs come from?
One of the ﬁrst incidents where an un-authorized GMO was
detected concerned the maize event CBH351 (StarLink™). This GMO
was authorized only for use in feeds but not in foods (EPA, 2008).
The un-authorized GMOs found and reported are most commonly
GMOs that are authorized in one jurisdiction but not in another
(Busch et al., 2004; Ruttink et al., 2010b). It is difﬁcult to exclude
intermingling of small quantities of such GMO into exported ship-
ments. Since the ﬁrst ﬁeld trials and commercialization of GMOs
took place, the USA has been the global leader in the application of
gene technology in plant breeding. Not surprisingly therefore, that
un-approved releases and intermingling have been reported several
times in the USA. The problem was reviewed by the US Government
Accountability Ofﬁce for both domestic and imported “un-autho-
rized” GMOs (GAO, 2008). Global trade, incomplete sanitation and
the complexity of segregating supply chains, all contribute to the dif-
ﬁculties. It is commonly acknowledged that a GMO authorized in onejurisdiction is unlikely to represent a signiﬁcant health or environ-
mental risk in another jurisdiction, also if the GMO has not been au-
thorized or even risk assessed in the second jurisdiction. However,
exceptions can be imagined. For example 1) if the GMO is not sufﬁ-
ciently reproductively isolated from or is particularly likely to affect
an endemic species in the country representing the second jurisdic-
tion; 2) the GMO belongs to a species serving as a staple food source
in the second jurisdiction but not in the ﬁrst, and introduction of the
GMO could result in unacceptably high levels of a GMO derived bioac-
tive compound in the local diet in the second jurisdiction; or 3) par-
ticular abiotic conditions in the second jurisdiction could alter the
performance of the GMO in an undesirable way.
A second possible source of un-authorized GMOs is escape from
ﬁeld-trial releases. There are several examples of such escapes, and
sometimes these represent a signiﬁcant risk to health and the envi-
ronment. This was for example the case with maize events developed
by the US company ProdiGene. The events developed to produce ex-
perimental pig vaccine were found as volunteers in soybean and sor-
ghum ﬁelds on former GM maize test plots (APHIS, 2011; Fox, 2003).
Another example is the release of glyphosate tolerant creeping bent-
grass (a golf grass) by the Scotts Company LLC (APHIS, 2011; Zapiola
et al., 2008). Failure in the quality control at the seed production level
is another possible reason for un-authorized release of GMOs as ex-
empliﬁed with the Bt10 maize case. Use of trait speciﬁc ELISA tests
that are unable to discriminate between an un-authorized and an au-
thorized event signiﬁcantly increases this risk compared to the use of
event-speciﬁc PCR tests. Un-authorized release of GMO can often af-
fect trade and the local economy (GAO, 2008). For example the
2006 incident of widespread low level contamination of rice pro-
duced in the U.S.A. with the regulated (un-authorized) event LL601
(Vermij, 2006) resulted in import bans for up to 2 years in the EU,
Japan, Russia and South Korea. Analytical testing of rice and associat-
ed costs for the exporters and importers immediately boosted. The
economic impact for the U.S. rice industry was signiﬁcant but rela-
tively short and the actual impact in U.S. dollars has been difﬁcult to
estimate (Li et al., 2010; Redick and Endres, 2009). A U.S. court re-
cently recommended that Bayer CropScience pay 125 million US$ in
punitive damages and US$ 11.8 million in compensatory damages
(Fox, 2011). The investigators from the U.S. Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service had hoped to identify how each GM rice line en-
tered the commercial rice supply, but the exact mechanism for intro-
duction could not be determined in either instance (APHIS, 2011).
Escapes from ﬁeld-trials can be a particularly difﬁcult problem in sit-
uations with poor communication on the GMO activities. In China, at
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to TT51-1, KeFeng-6 and KMD1 synonymous to Kemingdao) emerged
unexpectedly in the food supply chain. Information about these
GMOs and material for characterization and development of suitable
detection methods has only recently been obtained (see Reiting
et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011 and Wu et al., 2010 and references
therein). Reports published on the European Rapid Alert System for
Food and Feed (RASFF; https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/rasff-window/
portal/) show that these rice events are not uncommon in products
from China. The risk that people with access to un-authorized GMOs
during development and ﬁeld trials take seeds for own use or give
away such seeds to others is not negligible. Furthermore, this risk is
likely correlated with the perceived personal cost-beneﬁt and nega-
tively correlated with the educational level of the workers. The possi-
bility that a GMO is escaping from ﬁeld-trial releases into the
environment and/or eventually ends up in the food supply chain
without proper authorization therefore cannot be excluded. An es-
caped GMO can also end up in other countries than the country
where the ﬁeld-trial took place. International collaboration and
open information channels distributing data on ﬁeld releases are
therefore imperatives to minimize the risk of negative consequences
to health and the environment of such escapes. The U.S. ISB (http://
www.isb.vt.edu/), the OECD BioTrack and the BCH databases are
helpful in this respect (see e.g. Stein and Rodriguez-Cerezo, 2009),
but all these information systems could be drastically improved.
5. The matrix approach—the testing paradigm of today
With the large number of species and GMOs that can be present si-
multaneously in many products in the food supply chain, it is evident
that testing directly for presence/absence of each and every GMO is
extremely labor intensive and costly. The use of initial screening for
presence/absence of candidate species and elements common to mul-
tiple GMOs can facilitate rapid and cost efﬁcient discrimination of
samples: those containing GMO and those where no GMO can be
detected. Such screening can simultaneously provide clues to the
identity of present GMOs.
The EU-funded GMOchips project was ﬁrst to conceptualize and
systematically explore the consensus and matrix approaches
(European Commission, 2010). The latter approach has since been
further developed and is now applied in the majority of GMO testing
laboratories around the world. It is clearly the prevailing GMO testing
paradigm.
Setup and implementation of the matrix approach is a stepwise
process. First a relational matrix is established (Fig. 4). This matrix
is a table giving an overview of the presence/absence of analytical tar-
gets for a set of GMOs. For each analytical target, a corresponding an-
alytical module must be available. Ideally, the presence/absence is
experimentally veriﬁed for every combination of analytical module
and GMO. The latter should be represented by a reference material
from a reliable source, such as the developing company or a certiﬁca-
tion body. The veriﬁcation is important because of possible allelic var-
iation affecting the detectability, and errors and incompleteness in
published data and documents describing each GMO.
The term matrix is here used in the mathematical sense referring
to the relations between the two variables: the GMO and the analyt-
ical module detecting an element contained in the GMO (= the target
of the module). It is not to be confused with the more common use of
the term matrix to refer to a particular type of product subjected to
analysis (e.g. sausages, ﬂour, seeds…). The numbers of GMOs and
speciﬁc tests included in the matrix are ﬂexible, and can be increased
or decreased according to the available information, needs and specif-
ic situations. The frequency and distribution of the targets of screen-
ing modules among GMOs of the same and/or different species can
be exploited in the design and subsequent use of the matrix. The in-
formation can for example be used to design decision trees.Building up a matrix with modules representing all the speciﬁcity
levels (cf. Fig. 2) and experimentally veriﬁed data conﬁrming the per-
formance of each module in combination with each GMO is a huge
task. Publicly available lists of ﬁeld trials performed in various coun-
tries will usually contain limited information on the speciﬁc DNA se-
quences associated with the genetic modiﬁcations (Degrassi et al.,
2003). However, the lists will normally include some information
on the nature of the traits and possibly also on the sources of the
trait genes. Literature surveys, databases and bioinformatics can
then be combined in efforts to design screening tools for molecular
detection of the GMOs.
International collaboration would clearly be beneﬁcial. Indeed,
much of the work performed by method developers around the
world so far can be seen as duplicate work. There are for example
multiple published single element screening modules targeting the
CaMV P35S and T-nos. The target sequences and formats of these
modules are in some cases clearly distinct. Several of these modules
have also been collaborative trial validated against variable numbers
of GMOs (see e.g. EURL-GMFF, 2011). On the other hand, for the ma-
jority of alternative promoters and terminators, cloning vectors or
popular trait genes, there is presently no corresponding validated sin-
gle element screening module.
In the successive steps, when implementing the matrix approach
to analyses of samples, the matrix is used as a reference. The results
from application of selected screening modules on the sample are
compared with the data tabulated in the matrix. Observed presence/
absence patterns matching those predicted for (a) particular
GMO(s) are indicative of presence of the(se) GMO(s) in the sample.
Putative presence can then be veriﬁed using more speciﬁc analytical
modules such as event speciﬁc PCR modules. Notably, a satisfactory
LODpract is required.
Many laboratories mainly do single species analyses, e.g. seed test-
ing. In this case it may sufﬁce to consider only the GMOs belonging to
that single species and the related sub-matrix. If the product is un-
likely to contain any other species, or if it for other reasons is reason-
able to assume that presence of GMO is unlikely, it can be cost
efﬁcient to go directly to screening for GMO speciﬁc elements. If the
GMO screen is positive then impurities from other species should be
assessed to avoid interference with the results interpretation. Largely,
this only requires that the species to which the GMO can belong are
identiﬁed.
If the product subject to testing can contain material (DNA) from
more than a single species, it is strongly recommended to consider
the inclusion of species identiﬁcation screenings. Indeed, the list of
species for which one or more GMOs have been developed, ﬁeld-
trialed or commercialized is still quite limited (cf. BCH, 2011; CERA,
2011; GMO Compass, 2011).
Experience has shown that for many products containing soybean
and/or maize, presence of some GMO derived material (DNA) is very
likely. This is particularly true for feeds. For these products it is there-
fore often more relevant to consider the legal status of present
GMO(s) and whether or not the quantity exceeds relevant thresh-
old(s) such as a threshold for labeling of GM products.
Examples of how the matrix approach has been implemented into
rather complex analytical tools include the DualChip® GMO devel-
oped by Eppendorf Array Technologies (Hamels et al., 2009;
Leimanis et al., 2008), the SNPlex assay developed by Chaouachi
et al. (2008) and the GMOseek project (Querci et al., 2010).
National networks of GMO laboratories in e.g. Belgium (Van den
Bulcke et al., 2010), Germany (Waiblinger et al., 2010) and Japan
(Mano et al., 2009) have established formal national guidelines to
GMO testing. The guidelines usually apply the matrix approach and
typically start with screening for particular species and single ele-
ments and constructs. In Germany, this has been more extensively
elaborated than in any other country. At present ﬁve element- or
construct-speciﬁc modules have been validated through collaborative
Fig. 4. Example of a matrix with ten analytical modules and data tabulated from ten plant species. NB: the matrix shown is not complete with respect to existing GMOs on the global
market. It is only meant to illustrate the application of the matrix approach with examples in the following part of this review. GMOs that are not detectable with any of the ten
analytical modules are indicated in yellow. For these, detection can only be achieved with modules not included in the shown matrix, e.g. event speciﬁc modules. Presence of
the target (detectable with the analytical module) is indicated with a +, while absence (not detectable) is indicated with a −. The authorization status for any GMO will depend
on the jurisdiction. The status indicated here is only intended for illustration purposes and is not intended to reﬂect the actual authorization status in any jurisdiction.
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mance has been veriﬁed against reference materials of ten rapeseed
events, nine cotton events, one linseed (ﬂax) event, 19 maize events,
one papaya event, two potato events, ﬁve rice events, seven soybean
events and three sugar beet events. Out of nearly 100 GMOs belong-
ing to the listed species+tomato, only 12 are reported not to contain
any of the ﬁve screening targets (see the ofﬁcial matrix online:
http://www.bvl.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/09_Untersuchungen/
screening_tabelle_gvoNachweis.xls?__blob=publicationFile). Notably,
however, the theoretical presence needs to be experimentally veri-
ﬁed for approximately 30 of the nearly 100 listed GMOs. This task is
mainly depending on the availability of reliable reference material.
For some of the GMOs, there will probably never be certiﬁed material
available, but if DNA sequence data are available then synthetic DNA
fragments can be an alternative.
To facilitate result interpretation in the analytical laboratories the
electronic versions of the matrixes of the Belgian, German and Japa-
nese GMO testing systems have been supplemented with simple soft-
ware such as scroll down option menus in Excel. This software allows
the analyst to automatically obtain a list of the GMOs that can bepresent in the sample, given the observed presence/absence of ana-
lytical targets. Related decision support software tools have been de-
veloped in various, mainly EU-funded, projects. Some of these tools
allow the user to input additional information on (new) analytical
modules and GMOs. Examples include the Co-Extra decision support
system (Bohanec et al., 2013), the GMOtrack (Novak et al., 2009)
and the GMOseek (unpublished data).
6. Qualitative screening
Initially, when samples are analyzed, the most commonly applied
PCR modules are element speciﬁc screening modules. The resulting
presence/absence pattern is compared to the reference pattern of
the matrix, and it immediately becomes possible to part out the
GMOs that are not detectable at the LODpract. This will normally re-
duce the list of GMOs that can be present in the sample signiﬁcantly.
Furthermore, it will often help the analyst to identify PCR modules
that will provide the most information if applied successively. This
process can go through several rounds of screenings, but in most
cases it is not necessary to apply more than a few screening
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ciﬁc modules can be applied reasonably for conﬁrmation. If a positive
screening result is obtained, but no corresponding GMO is identiﬁed
successively, there is usually the possibility to perform additional an-
alyses to verify the result, e.g. the use of tail-PCR (Liu et al., 1995), an-
chor PCR (Theuns et al., 2002), cloning and DNA sequencing. This is
particularly relevant in case of samples containing ISK-class 3
GMOs. Such ad hoc analytical work is not commonly performed by
routine laboratories, and due to potentially high costs and uncertain
outcome it is not evident if and eventually when such work is
justiﬁable.
7. Exploiting quantitative information
Many screening modules are real-time PCR modules and therefore
potentially quantitative by nature. But they are usually less reliable
than event speciﬁc modules when it comes to quantiﬁcation. Two sig-
niﬁcant uncertainties are the cause of this reduced reliability. Allelic
variation can affect the ampliﬁcation efﬁciency of a target (Ghedira
et al., 2009; Papazova et al., 2010), as also exempliﬁed with a CaMV
P35S speciﬁc screening module discussed by Morisset et al. (2009).
In Bt11 maize a CaMV P35S-pat construct can have signiﬁcantly re-
duced detectability compared to e.g. TC1507 maize due to the length
of the amplicon (Waiblinger et al., 2010). In extreme cases, such as for
the CaMV P35S-pat construct in Bt11 in highly processed maize sam-
ples, or with unfortunate nucleotide substitutions, the target can even
become undetectable.
The number of target copies in different GMOs can also vary, both
between homo-, hemi- and heterozygous GM plant tissues (Cankar et
al., 2008; Holst-Jensen et al., 2006 and references therein) and with
respect to number of inserted copies integrated during transforma-
tion. The two soybean events A5547-127 and GU262 for example
contain one and two copies, respectively, of a construct in which
the CaMV P35S and pat gene is present (CERA, 2011). Other examples
can be found in Cankar et al. (2008).
The reliability of quantitative estimates is strongly inﬂuenced by
sampling andmeasurement uncertainty. Sampling particularly affects
the LODpract and LOQpract. Non-representative sampling will result in
signiﬁcantly inferior values (higher LOD/LOQ) than estimated from
PCR data (see also Sections 2.2.1 and 10.3). Details on the sampling
are not always known by the stakeholder who therefore inadvertent-
ly may believe that the LOD/LOQ is better than it is. The interested
reader is referred to Sustar-Vozlic et al. (2010) and references therein
for more comprehensive discussion of GMO sampling issues. Guide-
lines to estimation of measurement uncertainty in GMO testing are
published by Zel et al. (2007) and Trapmann et al. (2009). The mea-
surement uncertainty must always be taken into consideration
when interpreting quantitative data.
Despite a number of pitfalls, it can be useful to obtain quantitative
data in connection with screenings. If the absolute quantity of a
screening marker is at or below the LODabs, then any present GMO
containing this marker has a signiﬁcant risk of producing a false neg-
ative test result with an event speciﬁc module. A very high concentra-
tion of a speciﬁc screening marker on the other hand is a clear
indication of a very high GMO concentration, possibly high enough
to render more speciﬁc quantitation (but not identiﬁcation) superﬂu-
ous. Cankar et al. (2008) proposed to use such discrepancies in the
observed quantities between screening and event speciﬁc data in a
“differential quantitative PCR approach” to identify samples with pos-
sible presence of un-authorized GMOs. The idea is to use statistics and
assess the power of the statistical test to determine if the observed
quantity of a screening marker exceeds what can be explained by
the observed cumulative quantities of authorized events and non-
GM donors. If this is the case then the statistically signiﬁcant excess
quantity of the screening marker is a strong indication of the presence
of un-authorized GMO.Many GMO testing laboratories apply the same principles in their
day-to-day decisions on further conﬁrmatory testing after an initial
screening. For example, if a sample of maize is found to contain
CaMV P35S and T-nos in similar quantities, but also contains DNA
from soybean, then a conﬁrmatory quantitative test for presence of
the GM soybean event GTS 40-3-2 (Roundup Ready) may be sufﬁ-
cient. GTS 40-3-2 is at present the single GMO with the widest global
distribution and acreage. If the test reveals presence of GTS 40-3-2 in
a quantity similar to that of CaMV P35S and T-nos, then it may be jus-
tiﬁable not to perform additional event speciﬁc tests based on the
CaMV P35S and T-nos results. However, presence of other GMOs, in-
cluding un-authorized events cannot be completely excluded based
on this more simpliﬁed application of the differential quantitative
PCR principle. The reliability of the differential quantitative approach
is currently under study, using inter laboratory proﬁciency testing
scheme data.
8. Exploiting traceability data and publicly available information
Data on the origin of a sample can be very useful. Some GMOs are
only cultivated in one or a few countries, e.g. Bt63, KeFeng-6 and
KMD1 rice in China (Reiting et al., 2010), while others are cultivated
on a large scale worldwide, e.g. GTS 40-3-2 soybean (James, 2011).
The cost-efﬁciency of a testing scheme can be improved if this type
of information is taken into consideration. Then the testing can typi-
cally focus on the GMOsmost likely to be present in a sample. Various
decision support tools such as the Co-Extra DSS (Bohanec et al.,
2013), the GMOtrack (Novak et al., 2009) and the GMOseek (unpub-
lished data) are designed to do this. But, available information can
also be misleading, in which case reliance on stated origin can result
in failure to detect present GMO. Examples will be presented in
Section 10.
Ruttink et al. (2010b) demonstrated the potential of exploiting in-
formation–knowledge to detect a GMO placed on the market without
the necessary authorization. They proposed a distinction between the
traditional analyte centered approach, such as the matrix approach,
and an information–knowledge based approach. The starting point
was information about new biotech products under development
and in the pipeline for marketing. Ruttink et al. (2010b) mainly re-
trieved information from the internet using the search engine Google.
They used keyword based searches referring to company and product
name and more technical terms such as the short name of the trait
gene and the Latin binomial of the donor and recipient species. This
allowed Ruttink et al. (2010b) to retrieve enough information to de-
sign a test method and locate samples that could be tested. Detection
of the targeted un-authorized GMO in these samples was a clear proof
of concept. Since no speciﬁc detection method for this GMO was
available a priori the analyte centered approach would have failed
in this case. Despite the apparent success there is yet no example of
the application of this approach to other cases.
9. Reference materials
Reference materials in GMO analysis serve as positive and nega-
tive controls and as calibrants for quantitative analyses. For many
un-authorized GMOs there is no certiﬁed reference material (CRM)
available. In some cases it is possible to prepare a synthetic oligonu-
cleotide or cloned fragment with the same DNA sequence as the
intended target. The commutability of such control samples to the
corresponding GMO is, unfortunately, inferior to CRMs. Proﬁciency
testing samples is another commonly used source of positive controls.
Accreditation bodies have very strict requirements, among others for
the quality of reference or control materials. For many un-authorized
GMOs it will not be possible to meet these requirements, and thus it
will not be possible to apply the detection methods for these GMOs
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therefore only exceptionally done under ISO 17025 accreditation.
The availability of reference materials will vary, as particular
batches can be sold out or retracted. The German network of GMO
laboratories has prepared a comprehensive list of globally available
reference materials for GMOs. This list is published on the internet
(http://www.bvl.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/06_Gentechnik/
nachweis_kontrollen/referenzmaterialien.pdf?
__blob=publicationFile) and is updated several times per year. The
list includes all types of reference materials.
Reference materials and other control samples are usually only
characterized with respect to presence/absence of a limited set of tar-
gets. This means that the reference materials and control samples
sometimes also contain non-declared targets. Non-declared targets
can for example be traces of another GMO than the one for which
the sample is certiﬁed. It is important to appreciate this when apply-
ing the reference materials and control samples for example during
speciﬁcity testing of analytical modules and when results are inter-
preted in the screening phase before choosing the event-speciﬁc
modules.
There are pros and cons with every type of reference material. The
target sequence motif of a particular detection module can be ampli-
ﬁed e.g. using PCR technology or it can be cloned separately or as part
of larger constructions and propagated in plasmids in bacteria. Such
reference materials, once developed, can be easily distributed, puri-
ﬁed and produced in large quantities. As such they may ﬁt well
with the modular approach described in Section 2. Genomic DNA pu-
riﬁed from a speciﬁc GMO is perhaps more representative of the GMO
and materials subject to analysis, mainly because of its complexity.
This includes potentially interfering DNA sequence motifs and need
for removal of proteins and other potentially inhibitory substances
prior to the analysis. It is sometimes reported that cloned DNA and
genomic DNA can exhibit different ampliﬁcation efﬁciencies. Other
reports indicate that this is perhaps only due to incomplete puriﬁca-
tion or degradation of the genomic DNA. Several of the available
CRMs are kernels or ﬂours of GMOs, blended or not with non-GM ker-
nels or ﬂours. The certiﬁcation is a guarantee of commutability. How-
ever, CRMs may be less suited for the PCR analysis itself due to
possible presence of non-declared targets and difﬁculties with the
DNA puriﬁcation and quality. For more comprehensive discussions
on the performance of different types of reference materials we
refer e.g. to Burns et al. (2006) and Charels et al. (2007).
10. Analytical detection of un-authorized GMOs in practice
10.1. Direct detection of a registered, un-authorized GMO
The simplest scenario is one where the presence of a speciﬁc un-
authorized GMO is suspected in particular samples. For example, in
2006, after the announcement of its unintended release by Bayer
CropScience the observed presence of the un-authorized rice event
LL601 in U.S. shipments to Europe resulted in the launch of emergen-
cy measures (European Commission, 2006a). The ofﬁcial control lab-
oratories in the EU and Norway then performed analyses directly
targeting this single event in all rice lots originating from the U.S.A.
The matrix approach and broad screening were not applied in this
case. Instead, the laboratories used a construct-speciﬁc PCR module,
see EURL-GMFF (2006a, 2006b) for more details. But, relying too
much on the stated origin of a product can result in failure to detect
present GMO.
Until today, the only GM rice events detected in routine in rice
from the U.S.A. are LL62 and LL601. In 2010, a sample stated to be
“wild rice from U.S.A.” was received for analysis by the Norwegian
Veterinary Institute. Instead of analyzing directly for the LL rice
events, the sample was subjected to broader screening analysis. The
results indicated possible presence of another un-authorized riceevent, viz. Bt63. But Bt63 GM rice was to date only traced in Chinese
rice and had never been found in rice originating from outside of Asia.
Further analyses conﬁrmed that the sample contained Bt63 (RASFF
reference no. 2010.0853), and it was later made clear that the wild
rice from U.S.A. had been mixed with rice from Asia after arrival to
Europe. So the true origin of the Bt63 rice in the sample was conclud-
ed to be Asia, not the U.S.A. This Bt63 rice would never have been
detected if the sample had been analyzed based on traceability docu-
ments considering the claimed origin of the material solely. A similar
case was reported from Slovenia on a shipment of linseed (ﬂax) from
China via Germany (RASFF reference no. 2009.1640). The GMO in
question (FP967) had previously only been reported from Canada.
10.2. Limited screening-based GMO testing of products consisting of a
single or a low number of ingredients
Prior to analysis, it is necessary to clarify if a particular screening-
based PCR approach covers all authorized GMOs registered for a spe-
ciﬁc set of ingredients/species present in the sample. Sometimes, one
or more GMOs of a species contain none of the common screening el-
ements (cf. Fig. 4, events highlighted in yellow). In the latter situa-
tion, it will be necessary to apply a broader range of PCR tests to
determine the presence/absence status of the(se) GMO(s). If legally
only ofﬁcial ingredients have to be considered, then non-ingredient
species that are also present in the sample are formally irrelevant.
But this does not mean that they cannot interfere with the analysis
and confuse the results interpretation (Berben et al., 2009). The anal-
ysis of two example products presumably containing a single ingredi-
ent (= species) is described in the following. Four scenarios are
described in Fig. 5. In this example the ingredient species is rice. Be-
cause in our example matrix there is no authorized GM rice event,
the question to be answered is: does the sample contain an un-
authorized GMO?
The LOD is always a critical matter. The LODabs is usually around
5–10 copies of the target. At near LOD concentrations there is always
a signiﬁcant risk of false negative results for individual tests. This of
course must be taken into consideration when analytical results are
interpreted. If two screening targets are present in a GMO but at dif-
ferent insert copy numbers, e.g. one and four, the relative LOD for
these will differ four-fold for a DNA solution obtained solely from
that GMO. Unfortunately, the analyst will often not have detailed in-
formation on the copy number inserted for each target in each GMO.
Thus, the pragmatic approach will be to consider not only the ob-
served presence/absence pattern but also the approximate absolute
concentration of detected targets. The latter can be extrapolated
from standard curves, of course bearing in mind the possibility that
the target present in the GMOmay exhibit slightly divergent PCR per-
formance from the target present in the standards. It is reasonable to
assume (based on publicly available data) that the vast majority of
GMOs exhibit copy number ratios of insert targets in the range of
1:1 and 1:5. Thus, if one assumes a LODabs of 10 copies, then observed
presence of approx. 50 copies of a target known to be present in a
particular GMO would imply that it is unlikely that the particular
GMO is present if another target known to be present in that GMO
is not detectable in the sample. Scenarios 2 and 3 described with
Fig. 5 are examples where (semi-)quantitative information could
have relevance for correct results interpretation.
Two scenarios are described in Fig. 6. In this example, the ingredi-
ent species is soybean. Because there are both authorized and un-
authorized GM soybean events listed in our example matrix, there
are at least two questions that may need to be answered, depending
on the jurisdiction: 1) Does the sample contain any un-authorized
GMO (soybean)? 2) Does the sample contain so much authorized
GM-soybean that it has to be labeled (in the EU>0.9%)? Current prac-
tice among GMO testing laboratories varies. Some design their testing
strategy to focus initially on the ﬁrst question, usually limited to GMO
Fig. 5. A putative single ingredient product (rice) is subjected to quantitative analysis using a real-time quantitative PCR module targeting a single copy housekeeping rice gene and
screening with only two analytical modules: CaMV P35S and T-nos. The quantity of the single copy housekeeping rice gene indicates that the practical limit of detection for any GM-
associated target is 0.05%. All GM rice events are un-authorized. Scenario 1: Both screening modules show negative test results, and the interpretation is that GMO is not detectable
at an LOD of 0.05%. Scenario 2: The CaMV P35S is detected, while the T-nos is not. The interpretation is that the sample may contain LL62 and/or LL601 rice (red arrows). Conﬁr-
matory analysis can either be performed directly using two event speciﬁc modules, or screening with the single module targeting the bar gene. A negative test result with the bar
gene indicates that the source of the CaMV P35S is not one of the listed rice GMOs, while a positive test result will require ﬁnal conﬁrmatory testing with LL rice speciﬁc modules.
Scenario 3: The T-nos is detected while the CaMV P35S is not. The interpretation is that the sample may contain Bt63 rice (blue arrow), and conﬁrmatory analysis is then performed
using a Bt63 speciﬁc module. Scenario 4: Both screening modules are detected, and the interpretation is that the sample may contain KeFeng-6 or KMD 1 rice (green arrows) or a
mix of two or more of the GM rice events. This can only be conﬁrmed using modules speciﬁc to one or more of the GM rice events. However, when GM screening targets are
detected, there is also another possible explanation;− the presence of a non-declared impurity of GM-origin such as a GM soybean. Interpretation of the analytical results therefore
should take into consideration also the other species represented in the matrix. In scenario 4 the presence of both the CaMV P35S and the T-nos is compatible with the presence of
the authorized GM soybean event GTS 40-3-2 (black arrow).
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ation other species. Other laboratories only focus on the ﬁrst question
if there is reason to suspect that un-authorized GM soybean is pre-
sent. Suspicion can for example be based on presence/absence pat-
terns of screening targets that do not match the patterns predicted
by the matrix if only authorized GM soybean is present in the sample.
10.3. Complex screening-based GMO testing of products containingmultiple
ingredients and/or where DNA quantity and/or integrity are signiﬁcantly
affected by processing
Samples composed of several ingredients and/or with ingredients
that have been subjected to strong DNA-degrading processes are
often complicated to test. DNA degradation signiﬁcantly reduces the
detectability of GMOs because fewer intact copies of the target se-
quence will be present per mass (volume) unit of the sample materialFig. 6. A sample consisting of soybeans is tested. In this case, presence of GMOs of other spec
The limit of detection is a function of the number of soybeans from which DNA is extracted
ﬂour. The application of a soybean speciﬁc real-time PCR module conﬁrms that the limit of
analytical modules: screening with the CaMV P35S, pat and T-E9 speciﬁc modules, plus two e
latter modules are needed because these two events (highlighted in yellow) cannot be det
analytical modules show negative test results, and the interpretation is that GMO is not dete
but the other screening targets are not. The interpretation is that the sample may contain t
356043. It is only necessary to test for GTS 40-3-2 if the quantity can exceed a relevant (e.g.
then the quantity of this target can provide sufﬁcient information to determine if testing for
using an event speciﬁc module. Several additional scenarios can be imagined but are not tr
sented in Fig. 8.(Gryson, 2010). Mixing of ingredients reduces the relative fraction
that is derived from a speciﬁc ingredient, and thus also the relative
mass fraction of the total DNA derived from that ingredient in the
sample (Gryson, 2010). The LODpract for any GMO is a function of
the absolute quantity of DNA of the ingredient that is available for
PCR analysis (Holst-Jensen et al., 2003). The LODpract is therefore af-
fected by processing and mixing of ingredients. Notably, the DNA
must be of PCR-grade quality, i.e. structurally intact and virtually
free of inhibitors of the PCR. DNA can also act as an inhibitor in case
the total mass exceeds a certain concentration (e.g. >200 ng/μl for
maize DNA samples).
So, the ﬁrst problem is the rather low absolute quantity of target
DNA that can be included in a PCR. The second problem is the reduced
ability to discriminate between GMOs because of the possible larger
number of candidates that can explain the proﬁle of detected screen-
ing targets. The same screening PCR target can indeed be derivedies is irrelevant, unless it could affect results in a way that would lead to (legal) action.
. In this case approx. 104 soybeans are ground to ﬂour and DNA is extracted from this
detection is better than 0.1% for a single copy target. The ﬁrst step is testing with ﬁve
vent speciﬁc modules targeting 305423 and MON87701 (red arrows), respectively. The
ected with any of the available screening modules listed in the matrix. Scenario 5: All
ctable in the sample at an LOD better than 0.1%. Scenario 6: The CaMV P35S is detected,
he authorized GM-soybean event GTS 40-3-2 and/or the un-authorized soybean event
labeling) threshold. If CaMV P35S is detected with a quantitative real-time PCR module,
GTS 40-3-2 is necessary or not. Testing for 356043 soybean (blue arrow) has to be done
eated here. Some of these will in part be described and discussed in the example pre-
1330 A. Holst-Jensen et al. / Biotechnology Advances 30 (2012) 1318–1335from GMOs that belong to a different ingredient/species (cf. Fig. 4).
Furthermore, presence of for example three screening elements in a
sample composed of three species can be due to presence of one or
several GMOs containing none, one, two or even all three elements
in each of the three species. A similar problem is encountered when
stacked GMOs are present in a sample. This means that particular
screening results can be difﬁcult to interpret.
The ﬁrst level of information required for correct interpretation
and further design of the analytical procedure concerns the presence
and quantity of DNA of relevant species in the sample. The LODabs is
typically in the range of 5 to 10 target copies for GMO screening mod-
ules. Thus, if the number of haploid soybean genomes (haploid ge-
nome equivalents; HGE) in the extracted DNA is estimated to 5×103
per PCR, then the LODpract for soybean GMO would be around 0.1%
(=5 target HGE/5×103 species HGE). But if for example the quantity
of DNA of another species in the same sample is estimated to be as low
as 25 haploid genomes, then the LODpract for the same screening target
in that species is theoretically close to 20% (=5 target HGE/25 species
HGE).
As is the case in simple GMO screening approaches, here it is also
necessary to clarify whether a screening PCR approach is sufﬁcient to
detect all GMOs belonging to the species present, or whether there
are GMOs of any of the species that do not contain any of the screen-
ing elements (cf. the matrix). In the latter situation, it will be neces-
sary to apply more speciﬁc PCR tests to determine the presence/
absence status of the(se) GMO(s).
After conducting the screening, the results can be interpreted by
matching with the patterns described in the matrix. In the following,
six scenarios are described, using two examples of products. In Fig. 7,
the sample is maize/corn gluten feed. The presence of soybeanFig. 7. A sample consisting of maize gluten feed is analyzed. The following only describes sele
determined with a real-time quantitative PCR module is too low to offer acceptable limits o
use. Scenarios 8–10: The quantity of maize derived DNA indicates a LODpract of 0.1% and a LO
three modules speciﬁc to CaMV P35S, nptII and T-nos and analysis with two event speciﬁc m
are needed because these two events (and others also highlighted in yellow) cannot be det
and T-nos tests are quantitative. Scenario 8: The only modules yielding positive test results a
the sample contains authorized GM-maize, it is not required to label (at a threshold of 0.9%)
or MIR604 (blue arrows). Testing with event speciﬁc modules targeting these events is there
module also yields a positive test resultbLOQ. This target is present in two GM-maize events
speciﬁc test targeting the latter is therefore required. Scenario 10: The results are the sam
(2.4%±1.2%) are higher. The interpretation is that the sample may have to be labeled. Furth
ply chain is the soybean event GTS 40-3-2, and this event contains both the CaMV P35S an
small but signiﬁcant amount of soybean of which nearly 100% is GTS 40-3-2. The analytic
form of differential quantitative PCR. The conclusion is that GTS 40-3-2 is the likely source of
or statistical uncertainty, it is concluded that it is impossible to determine with necessary ce
labeling (0.9%). Thus, the only basis for action is if an un-authorized GM-maize event is d
applied.derivatives in the maize gluten is likely, and therefore has to be
taken into consideration when the results are interpreted. But soy-
bean is a “botanical impurity” and not an ofﬁcial ingredient, and
therefore exempt from labeling for example in the EU (Berben et al.,
2009). Whether or not presence of un-authorized GMO in a non-
ingredient is illegal depends on the jurisdiction. In the EU such pres-
ence is illegal (European Commission, 2003a). In Fig. 8, the sample is
a feed produced from multiple ingredients and likely to contain DNA
also from non-declared (plant) species.
11. Alternative and advanced technologies for routine and ad
hoc application
The technological advances in molecular biology gradually in-
crease the number of GMOs whose inserts do not contain any of the
genetic elements inserted into the currently commercial GMOs. Con-
sequently, the risk that a GMO is present in a sample but remains ef-
fectively undetectable with the currently applied detection modules
is real. A robust, cost-efﬁcient solution to this new challenge is not ev-
ident, although a few alternative and advanced technologies have
been proposed along with proof of concept.
These technologies are often more expensive and require exten-
sive, specialized manpower and time. They can be difﬁcult to stan-
dardize and validate through collaborative trials. Therefore, for
many of these technologies the application in routine testing as
such is unlikely. However, there is some potential for simpliﬁcation
and ad hoc design, e.g. adapted to particular species. Furthermore, if
samples subjected to analyses with one of these technologies are
taken on the basis of speciﬁc suspicion (cf. Ruttink et al., 2010b)
then some kind of information that may give clues to the nature ofcted examples of the possible scenarios. Scenario 7: The quantity of maize derived DNA
f detection (LOD) and quantitation (LOQ). Negative test results are therefore of limited
Qpract of 0.5% for a single copy target. The sample is ﬁrst subjected to screening with the
odules targeting DAS-40278-9 and LY038 (red arrows), respectively. The latter modules
ected with any of the available screening modules listed in the matrix. The CaMV P35S
re the CaMV P35S (0.5%±0.3%) and the T-nos (0.7%±0.4%). The interpretation is that if
. It is possible that the sample contains the un-authorized GM-maize events Bt176 and/
fore required. Scenario 9: The results are the same as in scenario 8, except that the nptII
;− the authorized MON863 and the un-authorized MON87460 (green arrow). An event
e as in scenario 8, except that the quantities of CaMV P35S (2.9%±1.5%) and T-nos
er testing is required. The single most frequently detected GMO in the agricultural sup-
d the T-nos. Testing for presence of soybean and this event indicates the presence of a
al laboratory translates the results into target copy numbers and applies a simpliﬁed
more than 50% of the total quantity of these screening targets. Given the measurement
rtainty whether the quantity of authorized GM-maize events exceeds the threshold for
etected. The same tests for unauthorized GMOs as applied in scenario 8 are therefore
Fig. 8. Testing for presence/absence of un-authorized GMO in a feed sample made from multiple ingredients. Initially, tests are performed to identify the species from which DNA is
present in the sample. The following only describes selected examples of the many possible scenarios. DNA from canola/rapeseed, maize/corn and soybean are detected. Screening
is performed only with three modules targeting the nptII gene, the pat gene and the T-E9, respectively. In this case, screening is not performed with the modules targeting the CaMV
P35S and T-nos because it is predicted that both will yield positive results and that the information associated with such a test result will be of little use with respect to detection of
un-authorized GMO. For laboratories wishing to test for compliance with quantitative labeling requirements, however, such data are potentially beneﬁcial. Scenario 11: The nptII
and the T-E9 are detected, while pat is not detected. The detected targets are present in altogether nine GMOs belonging to one of the three detected species: the authorized GT73
rapeseed, MON863 maize and MON89788 soybean, and the un-authorized Topas 19/2 and MS1 rapeseed, MON87460 maize and MON87705, MON87708 and MON87769 soybean.
But Topas 19/2 also contains the pat gene, which is not detected. A test is then performed targeting the ctp2-cp4epsps construct, which is present in GT73 rapeseed, and in MON
87705 and MON89788 soybean. This test is negative, and the list of un-authorized candidates with the nptII is reduced to three: MS1 rapeseed, MON87460 maize and
MON87708 soybean (red arrows). Event speciﬁc tests targeting these three GMOs are then performed. If these tests are negative, then it must be concluded that the detected
nptII gene is derived from an authorized GMO, from an unknown GMO (i.e. one not represented in the matrix) or from a non-GM source. Additional ad hoc testing is then required
(if justiﬁable) to determine if the sample contains un-authorized GMO. Scenario 12: The pat gene is detected, while the nptII gene and the T-E9 are not. The pat gene is present in
altogether six GMOs belonging to one of the three detected species: the authorized Bt11 maize and A2704-12 soybean and the un-authorized Falcon GS40/90 and Topas 19/2 rape-
seed, and A5547-127 and DAS-68416-4 soybean. But Topas 19/2 also contains the nptII gene, which is not detected. Event speciﬁc tests targeting the other three un-authorized
GMOs (blue arrows) are then performed. If these tests are negative, then it must be concluded that the detected pat gene is derived from an authorized GMO, from an unknown
GMO or from a non-GM source. As for scenario 11, to verify if the sample contains un-authorized GMO will require use of additional tests. Whether this can be justiﬁed depends
on the speciﬁc case, the available resources and the jurisdiction.
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Currently there are few GMO laboratories that alone have the re-
sources to do this systematically. A more realistic solution would be
the organization of a network of collaborating experts that should
feed information into a common database or decision support system.
A smaller group of experts dedicated to structure the information and
make it useful would also be required.11.1. Fingerprinting techniques
Raymond et al. (2010) and Ruttink et al. (2010a) reviewed the
available analytical tools for GMO detection and characterization,
and explored DNA ﬁngerprinting as an alternative to identify GMOs.
Fragment sizes and ﬁngerprint proﬁles can be compiled much like
the presence/absence proﬁles of PCR targets described with the ma-
trix approach. Single fragments can also be cloned and used as refer-
ence materials, and they can be sequenced to verify if they are of GM
origin. Fingerprinting (as well as the use of e.g. immunological tests)
can easily be seen as an extension of the more widely applied matrix
approach or “molecular toolbox”. Fingerprinting and DNA sequencing
may be particularly useful to identify and characterize un-authorized
GMOs of ISK-class 3. Once characterized, it is also possible to develop
speciﬁc PCR modules.11.2. Microarray technologies
High density microarrays here refer to arrays with thousands of
different probes. Tengs et al. (2007; 2010) used such arrays with
probes tiled through a compiled set of DNA sequence targets, to try
to elucidate if the sample in question contains DNA contig(s) with a
high degree of similarity to these targets. A less targeted but related
approach was proposed and demonstrated in silico by Nesvold et al.
(2005). In this model, the length (N nucleotides) of the oligonucleo-
tides on the array was shorter than typical PCR primers and selected
from the space of all N-mers by in silico subtraction of the N-mers
present in the corresponding (species) non-GM genome and other
N-mers unlikely to act as informative evidence of presence of foreign
(putative GM insert) DNA. Successively the sequence similarities can
be used as anchors for PCR and DNA sequence based characterization.
11.3. Next generation sequencing technologies
The cost of DNA sequencing has dropped dramatically over the
last decade and is predicted to continue to drop in the foreseeable fu-
ture. This can contribute to make use of advanced sequencing tech-
nologies more applicable. Transcriptome sequencing is applicable to
GMOs expressing novel transcripts only, and is building on the use
of subtraction against known non-GM transcriptomes in vitro and in
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rich samples for genotype speciﬁc sequences for two decades (see
e.g. Darrasse et al., 1994). For small genomes, such as those found in
microorganisms, it is only a matter of time and available resources be-
fore the full genome sequence is determined by so-called next-
generation sequencing technologies (Mardis, 2007). Recently this
type of technology played a key role in the characterization of the
strain of E. coli responsible for a high number of deaths in Europe in
the spring of 2011 (Mellmann et al., 2011). By subtraction of con-
served non-GM segments and re-sequencing of the genome this tech-
nology may contribute to the detection of unknown GM materials.
11.4. Prospective of alternatives to PCR
Neither high density microarrays nor next generation sequencing
is likely to be used routinely for GMO detection, mainly due to capac-
ity requirements. However, it is reasonable to expect that these tech-
nologies in the near future will become cheaper, will require less staff
training, and that the necessary equipment will become more wide-
spread. It is therefore likely that alternative and advanced tools grad-
ually will ﬁnd their way also into the GMO detection arena, at least on
an ad hoc basis. An example of such an ad hoc scenario would be if, for
a particular product, the perceived risk for adverse effects to health,
environment and/or economy is exceptionally high.
12. Discussion and conclusion
It is impossible to give recommendations for a universally applica-
ble testing scheme for the presence of un-authorized GMO. There are
simply too many variables involved: scope of the analyses, availability
of (validated) analytical tools and e.g. computer assisted decision
support systems, information relevant to the sample, the number of
plant species in the sample, the competence of the laboratory, etc. In-
formation relevant to the sample or analytical modules can also be
“cryptic”.
However, among the several applicable methodologies, the matrix
approach is applicable to detecting both authorized and un-
authorized GMOs and is de facto in use in numerous GMO testing lab-
oratories. Admittedly, even the matrix approach will probably fail to
detect many of the un-authorized GMOs currently under develop-
ment and some already commercialized or subject to ﬁeld trials. But
there is presently no realistic alternative available that can be applied
routinely.
It is recommended that laboratories with little or no experience
with standardized screening analysis and results interpretation do
not apply ad hoc testing schemes. This is because of the very broad
spectrum of possible scenarios, outcomes and sources of error, misin-
terpretation and analytical uncertainty. We recommend that labora-
tories begin with the application of well characterized and validated
screening and event speciﬁc modules used by other more experi-
enced laboratories. This will increase harmonization and facilitate di-
alog and recognition of strengths and weaknesses of applied concepts
and approaches; and also of results interpretation and decisions on
how to proceed on the basis of initial screening results. Consider-
ations on costs and time, availability of information on the origin of
the sample, the cultivations, ﬁeld-trials and developments of GMO
in different countries, reference materials and validated PCR modules,
etc. are relevant. The complexity of the problem may restrain the lab-
oratory from making the optimal choices, and decision support tools
are therefore desirable. Examples of such tools include the GMOtrack
(Novak et al., 2009), the GMOseek (unpublished data) and the Co-
Extra DSS (Bohanec et al., 2013).
Unintended escapes and commingling of un-authorized GMOs can
never be ruled out (GAO, 2008). With the expected rapid increase in
the number of GMOs that cannot be detected with the currently avail-
able screening tools, there is an evident need for development of newanalytical tools and strategies. Globalization of trade is unlikely to be
reversed. Even the USA that previously did not need to consider the
possibility that un-authorized GMOs could be imported now ac-
knowledge this possibility and the need for appropriate measures
(USDA, 2008).
Technology will continue to develop, as will the body of character-
ized genes and genomes available to developers of GMOs. Most likely
there will also be a growing number of GMOs with traits of industrial
or pharmaceutical relevance but not intended for food or feed use.
These could also enter the agricultural supply chains and cause ethi-
cal and religious concern or even pose a signiﬁcant risk to human
and animal health. It is of utmost importance that producers and
other stakeholders maintain segregation of supply chains as the pub-
lic controls will only be able to reveal contamination a posteriori. The
GMOs detectable with a matrix approach based screening strategy are
primarily what we classiﬁed as the ﬁrst and second generation of
GMOs. Third and fourth generation GMOs will require much more
speciﬁc analytical modules and possibly also detection methods
other than PCR. If ﬁrst and second generation GMOs are phased out
quickly, there will soon be few GMOs left that are detectable with
this approach. Third and fourth generation GMOs will sooner or
later outnumber the ﬁrst and second generation GMOs. Even if the
number and diversity of targets for screening modules is increased
signiﬁcantly, inevitably reliance on screening alone will never be
able to ensure the detectability of all relevant GMOs. Thus, reliance
on screening can potentially mislead stakeholders.
There are many pitfalls that can lead to wrong conclusions. Rough-
ly, one can distinguish between false positives (type I error), false
negatives (type II error) and quantitation errors. Each of these can
have severe consequences for trade, safety and trust in regulators, in-
dustry, etc. Wrong assumptions about the speciﬁcity and perfor-
mance of individual testing modules are perhaps the two most
important factors causing error. The list of GMOs containing a partic-
ular element or construct speciﬁc target is often incomplete due to
limited access to relevant information. There are many cases where
the presence of a particular GMO is non-compliant with legislation
or a trade contract. When interpretation of screening results indicates
presence of such a GMOwe strongly recommend veriﬁcation using an
event speciﬁc PCR module or DNA sequencing.
The presence/absence in a particular GMO of the target of a PCR
module should be established experimentally, if at all possible. Theo-
retical presence of a target must be treated with caution, as the target
may be truncated, rearranged, exhibit substitutions in primer/probe
loci or even be absent in some cases. As pointed out in Section 10.2
the use of quantitative data can aid the analyst, but particular atten-
tion should be given to results at near LOD concentrations and com-
parability of ampliﬁcation efﬁciencies. The latter can vary
signiﬁcantly for similar targets in different GMOs, but must be nearly
equal throughout the PCR to provide reliable quantitative estimates
(Cankar et al., 2006; Nogva and Rudi, 2004).
We believe that both copy numbers, sizes of inserts/target frag-
ments and complete DNA sequence data could be added to the matrix
as additional useful information. However, this cannot be a require-
ment. Large reference databases linking molecular data and other in-
formation with the speciﬁc analytical modules can undoubtedly
contribute to improve the reliability of analytical work and results in-
terpretation. The main challenges in this respect are the coordination
of data input and quality assurance and how the data can be made
available to the analytical laboratories.
Perhaps the most important single factor responsible for the lack
of reliable approaches to comprehensive detectability of un-
authorized GMOs is the lack of global transparency. The Biosafety
Clearing House (BCH) and the Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity
(CPB) and corresponding databases are instruments that shall play a
pivotal role in this respect. However, not all countries have ratiﬁed
the protocol yet and others do not feed in the appropriate information
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situation will change as a consequence of a possible emergence of un-
authorized GMOs onto the market in these countries. Davison (2010)
speculated that convergence of interests could reassemble e.g. the EU
and USA in an unexpected way.
Considering the size and severity of the problems that un-
authorized GMOs could potentially represent, we ﬁnd it timely to
call for: 1) increased awareness among the relevant stakeholders,
and 2) implementation of effective segregation routines.
Company stewardship is crucial and guidelines such as the USDA
Biotechnology Quality Management System (BQMS; USDA, 2011)
are useful in this respect. Development of new detection tools takes
several years, the validation of the standard methods even more. Sev-
eral years of “immobility” in developing robust new tools to trace un-
known GMOs routinely have passed by. Now, it is time to upgrade the
level of GMO detection to a level matching the discriminating capac-
ities required by the new generation of GMO to ascertain and safe-
guard the quality of all products in the food/feed chain globally.
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